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Weekly Media Report – July 14-20, 2020 




1. NPS Goes Online: The Good and Bad of Crash Distance Learning 
(USNI 15 July 20) … James J. Wirtz, Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at NPS 
The shelter-in-place order hit Monterey County, California, about a week before the end of winter term classes 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. This turn of events was taken in stride. Students were a class or two away from 
their finals and, for the most part, could complete their remaining assignments from home. The pressing challenge 
was the looming need to deliver all of the spring term in-residence courses in an online format with less than three 
weeks’ notice. 
 
2. Fleet Focus: Agility Summit Seeks Creative Solutions to Naval Challenges 
(DVIDS 16 July 20) … Warren Duffie 
Improving how emerging technologies are identified to meet urgent warfighter needs, and accelerating 
technology transition to the fleet. Identifying military and civilian personnel in the naval workforce and Naval 
Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE), who are taking unique and successful approaches to 
innovation… The centerpiece of the Agility Summit will be an educational “agility challenge” involving 10 student 
teams invited from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval War College (NWC) and Marine Corps 




3. Lifting the Veil on the Lightly Manned Surface Combatant 
(Center for International Maritime Security 17 July 20) … Ben DiDonato 
As the U.S. Navy moves into the unmanned age and implements Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), there 
is a need for small, lightly manned warships to streamline that transition and fill roles which require a human crew. 
Congress has expressed concerns about unmanned vessels on a number of fronts and highlighted the need for a class 
of ships to bridge the gap. The Naval Postgraduate School’s Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability 
program (LMACC) has designed a warship to meet this need. 
 
FACULTY: 
4. To Secure the Election: Tame the Russian Bear in Cyberspace 
(Council on Foreign Relations 13 July 20) … Dr. Scott Jasper, Naval Postgraduate School Lecturer 
On June 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United States as a country gripped by a “deep 
internal crisis” due to the refusal by opponents of President Trump to accept his “obvious” 2016 election victory and 





5. Four Years On, a Cloud of Mystery Still Surrounds Turkey’s July 15 Coup 
(Ahvalnews.com 14 July 20) … Hot Pursuit 
Four years have passed since the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, but there is still a lot of 
controversy and discussion over the events that occurred that day, said Ryan Gingeras, a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and an expert on Turkish, Balkan and Middle East history, in a 
podcast with Ahval's Editor-in-Chief Yavuz Baydar and its English Editor Ilhan Tanır. 
 
6. Greta Marlatt Wins Librarian of the Year Award 
(Center for Homeland Defense and Security 14 July 20) 
Greta Marlatt is widely known for her work with the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) and Dudley 
Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Around campus, she’s also known as the definitive source 
for delicious chocolate treats—which she often has displayed in a bowl in her office to share with the many guests 
who frequently visit her. But now, she has a new title: 2019 Federal Librarian of the Year. 
 
7. Military Expert Sees Rise of Pandemics and Climate Change 
(Livermore Independent 16 July 20) … Jeff Garberson 
In an online talk scheduled for next Wednesday evening, nationally known defense expert John Arquilla, a 
distinguished professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, will discuss the rise 
of pandemics and climate change among issues that now must be considered in a rapidly evolving U.S. national 
security picture. 
 
8. Listen: How the Oil Wars Myth Continues to Shape US Foreign Policy 
(S&P Global 20 July 20) … Meghan Gordon 
US President Donald Trump has used the phrase "take the oil" many times, both as a candidate to criticize 
previous administrations' strategies in Iraq and while in the White House when discussing Syria… Emily 
Meierding, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, analyzed more than 600 international 
military disputes between 1912 and 2010, and determined that classic oil wars are a myth. 
 
9. COVID-19, Information and the Deep Structure of the International System 
(The Cypher Brief 20 July 20) … Dr. Leo Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor of Defense 
Analysis 
The COVID19 crisis comes at a time when the existing structure of the Globalized Liberal system is under 
extreme stress. What do conflicting messaging strategies around the origins of the pandemic tell us about the 




10. Dr. Allen Harper Joins T-Rex Solutions as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity 
(Security Magazine 14 July 20) 
T-Rex Solutions, LLC announced Marine Corps veteran, entrepreneur and cybersecurity executive Dr. Allen 
Harper, an NPS alumnus, joined the organization as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity. Dr. Harper will lead 
the company’s delivery of secure cloud services to the Federal government. 
 
11. Candidate Q&A: Andrew Miller, Skagit PUD Board of Commissioners 
(goSkagit.com 15 July 20) … Richard Walker 
Andrew Miller, an NPS alumnus, is seeking election to Position 1 on the Skagit Public Utility District Board of 
Commissioners. 
 
12. Tearing Down Racism or Erasing Our History? 
(Coronado Times 16 July 20) … Edward Anthony Moore III 
There has been a lot of debate about whether or not we should be tearing down statues of Confederate leaders or 
renaming government institutions and facilities named after historic segregationists. Are we destroying monuments 
 
 
to racism or are we erasing important parts of our history? Let me tell you a short story and then I’ll let you decide… 






UPCOMING NEWS & EVENTS: 
July 21: V-SGL with HOF Grads Army Gen (ret) Keith Alexander and Vice Adm (ret) Jan 
Tighe 





NPS Goes Online: The Good and Bad of Crash Distance Learning 
(USNI 15 July 20) … James J. Wirtz, Dean of the NPS School of International Graduate Studies 
The shelter-in-place order hit Monterey County, California, about a week before the end of winter 
term classes at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). This turn of events was taken in stride. Students 
were a class or two away from their finals and, for the most part, could complete their remaining 
assignments from home. The pressing challenge was the looming need to deliver all of the spring term in-
residence courses in an online format with less than three weeks’ notice. Although NPS has experience 
delivering content in a variety of venues, formats, and mediums, many faculty had to scramble to 
familiarize themselves with various “go-to meeting programs” and modify course content to fit these 
delivery modalities. No one had ever tried doing this before. In fact, no one had even suggested that it 
should even be attempted. 
Glitches were common during the first couple of days. Nevertheless, by the end of the second week of 
classes, it was evident that the faculty and students had risen to the challenge and that NPS had several 
advantages that made the rapid shift to online learning possible. One advantage was an information 
technology infrastructure that could support thousands of “streaming” users simultaneously. Another was 
a tech-savvy student body with access to good internet connectivity and high-quality home computing. 
Winter graduates stuck in Monterey because of “stop-movement” orders also helped technologically 
challenged professors and coached new students by serving as informal teaching assistants in online 
classes. The oft-repeated concern that neo-Luddite faculty constituted the primary obstacle “to going 
online” also proved to be grossly inaccurate. The faculty never complained about the shift to online 
delivery, worked hard to master the new technology, and went to great lengths to ensure that the students 
stayed on track. 
What was lost and what was gained in this quick shift to distance learning? There are a host of 
surveys being undertaken and metrics being created to answer that question and it will take time before 
the results are received and analyzed. Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a few observations about the 
crash distance-learning program launched by NPS and a new initiative that emerged from this 
experience—developments that would never have occurred in the absence of the challenge created by a 
national emergency.  
 
 
In-Residence Graduate Education is Best 
Learning is occurring despite the fact that classroom interaction is transpiring across an electronic 
medium. What is missing, however, are the second-, third-, and fourth-order opportunities for learning 
that take place naturally in the in-residence classroom setting. These opportunities occur as students 
discuss their lessons outside of class—going over difficult concepts, clearing up misperceptions, and 
identifying mistakes. The faculty recognized this lacuna and quickly arranged for chat rooms, “water 
cooler” events, and extra office hours. Nevertheless, the general assessment is that this kind of interaction 
is difficult to undertake online, and this assessment was supported by student and faculty opinion surveys 
administered during the spring quarter. 
By contrast, in-resident student-to-student learning occurs naturally over lunch conversations, during 
walks across campus, or at the local watering hole. In addition, access to laboratories and secure facilities 
cannot be provided online. To allow laboratory research and the use of classified materials to continue, 
NPS went to extraordinary lengths to provide individual faculty and students with access to critical 
laboratories and secure spaces while maintaining social-distancing protocols.  
Learning that is not part of the formal curricula also is lost. Is that important? Well, a student once 
told me that he was happy he attended NPS because it gave him an opportunity to learn about the Navy. 
The student was not talking about the latest strategy pronouncement or a new naval technology or 
operational scheme. Instead, he was talking about the very essence of the Navy itself—the chance to rub 
shoulders with Navy officers from different communities provided insight that was hard to come by in an 
 
 
operational setting. One also can expand that observation by noting that when your classmates also 
include Marines, Army, and Air Force officers, and students from allied and partner countries, 
opportunities abound to learn about “the force,” the whole-of-government and coalition team that usually 
swings into action during a crisis or conflict. This sort of learning opportunity is not only invaluable, it is 
relatively unique. 
The successful transition to distance learning for the curricula at NPS raised immediate questions 
about making the transition permanent. Why not simply enroll officers at their duty stations and skip the 
rigmarole, to say nothing of the cost, of moving them for a year or two of study at NPS? Some observers 
might believe that the time has arrived to forego the “nice to have” experiences provided by in-resident 
graduate education. In asking this question, however, observers fail to realize that the emergency 
transition to distance learning at NPS involved synchronous classes to full-time students—students were 
in a position to devote at least 16 hours each week to online classes and at least another 40 hours to 
reading and study. Of course, one could deliver the same material in an asynchronous mode, but that 
would do little to ameliorate time requirements. If a student spent 25 percent of his or her time doing 
schoolwork, it would take approximately four years to complete a one-year in-residence course of study. 
Classified or laboratory work also would be problematic if not impossible, a real shortcoming at a time 
when Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) is highlighting the need for students and faculty 
to tackle the key operational problems facing the Navy and to integrate new technologies into the fleet. 
Online learning can save some costs—permanent change of station (PCS) to Monterey—but it will take 
about the same time online to cover the same course content.   
 
It Boils Down to Time and Money 
This recent foray into distance learning also highlighted the observation that educational debates in 
naval circles often boil down to issues of time and money. Admittedly, scholars and practitioners like to 
discuss curricula with an eye toward designing exciting learning experiences that will serve both the 
strategic needs of the Navy and the professional development of officers and enlisted personnel. The 
renowned strategist Colin Gray, for example, often waxed poetically about the contents of strategic and 
scientific education for officers and the best way to develop capable strategists. Nevertheless, Gray failed 
to realize that most officers lack the opportunity to get any relevant education at all. 
Virtually all due-course officers lack the time in their operationally oriented careers for in-residence 
graduate education, and even if they did, the Navy lacks the resources to send more than a small 
percentage of them to school at any one time. The “time-money” constraint limits the number of officers 
who can benefit from the tailored in-resident education available at NPS. 
Distance Learning is an Untapped Resource 
The Navy’s recently promulgated Education for Seapower Strategy highlights the need to bring more 
education to the fleet, enabling the Navy to incorporate waves of emerging technologies faster into the 
fight than potential opponents. Courses in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, robotics, or even more 
traditional engineering subjects are the order of the day. Nevertheless, the Navy simply lacks the 
resources to provide every officer with an 18-month in-residence experience in Monterey to earn a 
master’s degree. Under these circumstances, distance learning is the only way to provide this education to 
thousands of officers and senior enlisted personnel. 
Although our experience suggests that it is not possible to replicate the in-residence experience 
online, with luck and hard work full-time students can complete similar online and in-resident programs 
at about the same pace. Therein lies the rub. Distance learning can eliminate the time and expense 
involved in PCS moves, but cannot address the need for time to actually complete a curriculum. Instead 
of focusing on offering graduate degrees online, Navy leaders should consider using new distance-
learning technologies to reach officers who would benefit from a broadening education, but who lack the 
time to devote to full-time study. Lectures tailored to Navy requirements can be recorded and packaged 
with appropriate readings and study questions, not as an attempt to replicate the in-resident graduate 
experience, but as an effort to deliver information about critical subjects in an efficient manner. 
Asynchronous delivery can further reduce the burden on students, allowing them to review the materials 
 
 
when their work schedule permits. Obtaining a graduate degree online might be the holy grail of distance 
learning, but there are less ambitious goals that can be quickly reached with the expenditure of realistic 
amounts of time and money. 
NPS is about to conduct a beta test of just this type of initiative within OPNAV and some Department 
of Defense agencies. The test is a course comprised of 18 40-minute lectures that introduce students to the 
rise of great power competition in the world today. Originally part of the in-resident curriculum, the 
course has moved entirely online—in-resident students at NPS who are still sheltering in place also will 
have the opportunity to take this asynchronous course online and receive one graduate credit for their 
participation. Once the results of the beta test have been assimilated, the course should be ready for the 
fleet by early 2021. The course might then be continually refreshed at about 18 month intervals—an 
interval typical of the refresh rate of college textbooks. 
 
The Way Forward 
Too much time is spent attempting to replicate the in-resident experience online. Instead, Navy 
leaders should think about distance learning as a way to bring knowledge to the fleet when it is 
impossible to meet educational demands through in-residence education. In other words, virtually 
everyone in the Navy would benefit from a “short-course” introduction to the topic of great power 
competition, but it is impossible to bring everyone in the Navy to NPS to take that course in residence. 
This is the niche where distance learning can really contribute. 
Luckily, the Education for Seapower Strategy has positioned the Navy to take advantage of the 
distance-learning experience gained during the emergency shut-down caused by COVID-19. It now 
possesses a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting Development (N7) who is in a position to 
sponsor specific asynchronous short courses and more advanced graduate certificates for the fleet. These 
courses would not replace the in-resident experience, which should be expanded to the maximum extent 
possible. Nevertheless, distance learning can provide “subject-matter awareness” to thousands of officers 
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Fleet Focus: Agility Summit Seeks Creative Solutions to Naval Challenges 
(DVIDS 16 July 20) … Warren Duffie 
Improving how emerging technologies are identified to meet urgent warfighter needs, and 
accelerating technology transition to the fleet. Identifying military and civilian personnel in the naval 
workforce and Naval Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE), who are taking unique and 
successful approaches to innovation. 
These are some of the issues the NavalX Agility Cell, or NavalX, will tackle during its Agility 
Summit on Sept. 21-25 in Alexandria, Virginia. The event will be hosted by NavalX and supported by 
multiple partners, including the Office of Naval Research (ONR). 
“The purpose of the Agility Summit is to foster meaningful discussions and collaboration that will 
have a lasting impact on the Navy and Marine Corps,” said the Hon. James Geurts, assistant secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, who created NavalX. “It will give us a greater 
understanding of the tools and talent we have to identify performance gaps and opportunities for greater 
efficiency.” 
NavalX enables collaboration; accelerates the pace of discovery, learning and experimentation; and 
fosters the naval workforce’s capacity for innovation and agility. It gives Sailors, Marines and 




This enables naval organizations like ONR to better serve warfighter needs by connecting individuals 
promoting innovative ideas with experts who can experiment with those ideas, invest in them or help turn 
them into something tangible for the Navy and Marine Corps. 
The upcoming Agility Summit is designed to build partnerships in the DoN on matters of innovation, 
acquisition and transition—to share best practices and discuss problems facing the fleet. It will highlight 
innovation success stories and discuss future efforts through presentations and workshops. 
The centerpiece of the Agility Summit will be an educational “agility challenge” involving 10 student 
teams invited from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval War College (NWC) and Marine Corps 
University (MCU). The teams will work to solve pressing naval problems. 
“An event like the Agility Summit enables those in the NR&DE to benefit from the creativity and 
dynamic thinking of the next generation of Navy and Marine Corps leaders,” said Dr. Rich Carlin, ONR’s 
director of technology-acceleration programs. “The students participating in the challenge will 
demonstrate the vision and ideas required to keep our nation ahead of its adversaries in the great power 
competition we currently face.” 
NPS, NWC and MCU student teams should visit https://www.eventbrite.com/e/agility-summit-2020-
student-challenge-application-registration-113117134394. There, they can learn about fleet issues and 
challenges, choose one to address and apply to compete at the Agility Summit. For more information, 
email agility@navy.mil. 
The closing date for student submissions and applications is July 31, and the final 10 teams will be 
chosen during the week of Aug. 7. Selected teams will receive funding to travel to the NavalX facility in 
Alexandria, Virginia. 
People can attend the summit both physically and virtually. In-person attendees will wear masks and 
practice social distancing. 
During the Agility Summit, the student teams will receive detailed briefs about their respective naval 
problems, brainstorm solutions and pitch their ideas to a panel of judges to include Geurts and Chief of 
Naval Research Rear Adm. Lorin C. Selby. 
The winning teams will receive 10 weeks of follow-on support and access to requirement holders, end 
users and subject matter experts at warfare centers and naval labs to develop their ideas. Afterward, the 









Lifting the Veil on the Lightly Manned Surface Combatant 
(Center for International Maritime Security 17 July 20) … Ben DiDonato 
As the U.S. Navy moves into the unmanned age and implements Distributed Maritime Operations 
(DMO), there is a need for small, lightly manned warships to streamline that transition and fill roles 
which require a human crew. Congress has expressed concerns about unmanned vessels on a number of 
fronts and highlighted the need for a class of ships to bridge the gap. The Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Lightly Manned Autonomous Combat Capability program (LMACC) has designed a warship to meet this 
need. 
The need for these small, heavily armed warships has also been well established, and is based on 
extensive analysis and wargaming across the Navy’s innovation centers. These ships will provide 
distributed forward forces capable of conducting surface warfare and striking missile sites from within the 
weapons engagement zone of a hostile A2/AD system. They will be commanded by human tactical 
experts and operate in packs with supporting unmanned vessels, like the Sea Hunter MDUSV, to 
distribute capabilities and minimize the impact of combat losses. 
 
 
Our intent with this article is to publicly lay out the engineering dimension of the LMACC program. 
Since the United States does not have a small warship to use as a baseline, it is necessary to first establish 
what our requirements should be based on our unique needs. Fortunately, this can be accomplished in a 
relatively straightforward manner by broadly analyzing how foreign ships are designed to meet their 
nation’s needs, and using that understanding to establish our own requirements. As such, we will start by 
examining the choices faced by other nations, use that to develop a core of minimum requirements for an 
American warship, examine its shortcomings when compared with other budget options, and finally 
discuss how to affordably expand on that to deliver a capability set the Navy will be happy with. Once we 
have established our requirements and overall configuration, we will conclude with a discussion of our 
approach to automation, manning, concepts of operations, future special mission variants, and current 
status. 
(The scope of this article has been deliberately limited to the engineering side of the LMACC 
program. Our acquisition approach will be discussed in an upcoming issue of the Naval Engineers 
Journal. Fleet and budget integration was discussed in a previous article on USNI blog, “Beyond High-
Low: The Lethal and Affordable Three-Tier Fleet.”) 
 
Examination of Foreign Designs 
Due to our relative lack of practical domestic experience in the field of small warship development, 
we will start with an examination of foreign designs to build a transferable understanding of their 
capabilities, limitations, and design tradeoffs. Since there are many ship classes used worldwide, it is 
impractical to discuss every example individually. We will instead discuss mission areas and 
compromises in generic terms and leave it to the reader to consider how specific foreign designs were 
built to meet their nation’s needs. Areas of design interest include anti-ship missiles, survivability, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), and launch facilities. The first three subsections divide the discussion between 
large and small nations, while the final subsection is split by type of launch facility. Each subsection then 
concludes with a discussion of how this translates to the United States’ unique situation. This will then set 




Small warships are frequently given labels like “missile boat” or “corvette” based on their primary 
armament of anti-ship missiles with little further thought. However, not all missiles are created equal. The 
choice of missile is driven by the platform’s intended use. 
Small nations (e.g. Norway) attempting to defend themselves on a limited budget typically prioritize 
lethality with a highly capable missile designed for sinking major warships. However, because they often 
face limitations in offboard sensors, strategic depth, and force structure to absorb combat losses, they tend 
to sacrifice range and networking capability to control missile cost and weight. 
Large nations prioritizing coastal defense against a more powerful opponent (e.g. Russia and China’s 
A2/AD systems) tend to view their small warships as part of a larger system. These ships are intended as 
much to complicate enemy targeting and defensive formations as they are to sink ships. As a consequence 
of this, they are more likely to invest in range and networking since they can reasonably expect to take 
advantage of it, but may be willing to save money by arming these ships with less expensive, and 
therefore typically less lethal, weapons. 
Due to the nature of the U.S. Navy’s highly networked, forward deployed forces, we cannot accept 
these compromises and must arm our small warships with highly lethal, long-range, networked weapons. 
 
Survivability 
A major concern with all warships is survivability. One of the key distinguishing features of small 
warships is how they address this problem. Rather than rely on a large, expensive missile system to 
destroy threats at long range, these small warships instead rely primarily on avoiding attack and feature 
only limited point defense weapons. This is achieved through a combination of small size, signature 
reduction, electronic warfare, and tactics. 
 
 
It is important to remember other nations are frequently focused primarily on pre-launch survivability 
rather than a counterattack based on the missiles’ signature. This lack of focus on post-launch 
survivability is generally based on the assumption that the cost ratio of the exchange will generally be in 
their favor even if they lose the ship. Another important consideration, especially for smaller nations, is 
that their ports are usually very vulnerable to a standoff strike, so surviving ships may not be able to 
rearm or refuel and are therefore effectively out of action even if they do survive. For large nations with 
sophisticated A2/AD systems, protecting these ships is usually primarily the responsibility of other 
platforms, allowing significant savings by reducing survivability-related costs. 
Smaller nations usually invest more in survivability features and trade endurance for extremely high 
speed to improve their odds of getting into attack position before they are sunk. They also commonly 
employ tactics to make their ships difficult to track in peacetime by exploiting maritime geography and 
blending into commercial traffic to avoid a preemptive strike. 
The United States can count on having a safe port to rearm somewhere, even if it requires 
withdrawing all the way to CONUS, so we would need to further emphasize evasion since these ships 
would have to persist within hostile A2/AD networks even after launching missiles. This means it would 
be essential for a small American warship to use a stealthy, networked missile capable of flying deceptive 
routes to mask the launch point, as well as the best electronic warfare equipment, passive sensors, and 
acoustic signature reduction we can afford. Other forms of signature reduction are an interesting question 
because there is a risk of standing out from civilian traffic if the warship’s signature is significantly 
different from those around it. After all, a Chinese maritime patrol aircraft could easily recognize that a 
“buoy” making an open-ocean transit is actually a small warship. On the flipside, we have no need for the 
high speed favored by many foreign nations, especially since blending in with slow-moving civilian 
traffic will be a critical aspect of survivability. Therefore, we should trade speed for range to control cost 
and project power from our generally safe but distant ports. 
One final U.S.-specific feature which could greatly enhance survivability inside A2/AD networks, 
reduce range requirements, and reduce the logistical burden is the exclusion of gas turbines in favor of 
diesel engines. This will allow these ships to stop at any commercial port to take on diesel fuel, and 
possibly food, while further enhancing the illusion that they are small commercial vessels. With some 
imaginative leadership, this will provide virtually unlimited in-theater range and loiter time with minimal 
logistical support, simplifying our operations and complicating the situation for the enemy. 
 
ASW 
While many small warships include ASW capability, they are usually intended to operate as coastal 
area denial platforms rather than oceangoing escorts or sub-hunters. For nations worried about hostile 
submarines, this area denial provides essential protection to ports and other coastal facilities which would 
otherwise be extremely vulnerable. In contrast, performing the latter high-end missions requires the large 
aviation facilities and expensive sonars of a frigate or destroyer. 
Thanks to our large nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet and the remoteness of hostile submarine 
forces, we don’t need a small surface ship to defend our ports from submarines, so this ASW equipment 
is generally best omitted. The U.S. only needs the ship to have a reasonable chance of surviving in a 
theater with hostile submarines, and this can be most economically provided by acoustic signature 
reduction and appropriate tactics. In fact, the active sonar systems used for area denial by other nations 




Many small warships include launch facilities of some form for boats, helicopters, small unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV), and underwater vehicles (UUV). 
A boat launch facility is very important for a variety of maritime security operations and general 
utility tasks including allowing access to unimproved coastlines. Thanks to this utility and their modest 
space and weight impact, they are found on many small warships. It is also important to note that a boat 
 
 
launch facility can generally launch USVs of similar size if desired to perform a variety of functions 
including acting as offboard sensors and decoys. 
While the utility of naval helicopters is well established, they are relatively uncommon on small 
warships. Adding full aviation facilities requires a major increase in ship size, crew, and cost. Even a 
simple helipad for vertical replenishment has a major impact on topside configuration. Furthermore, 
helicopters are relatively visible and can thus make it much easier for an adversary to distinguish the 
warship from civilian traffic. 
A much more common way of providing aerial surveillance for small warships is small UAVs. 
Because they can easily be added to existing ships, they have become common additions to small military 
and coast guard vessels worldwide. These aircraft provide many of the benefits of a helicopter with a 
much lower signature and little to no design impact on the ship. Furthermore, considering their 
proliferation in the civil sector, launching a small UAV is no longer a recognizably military activity. It is 
reasonable to assume all future designs will at least consider the operation of hand-launched drones, and it 
is highly likely many will also integrate launch systems for larger assets as well. 
While UUV launch facilities are currently relatively rare outside dedicated MCM platforms, the 
maturation of this technology makes it worthy of more general consideration. UUVs could perform a 
range of other missions including undersea search and interacting with undersea cables without the need 
to specialize the ship itself. Furthermore, the launch facilities could also be used to transport additional 
MCM UUVs for use by other ships. As such, it seems likely this capability will proliferate since the 
launch facilities aren’t especially large, although it is still too early to say for certain exactly how useful it 
will actually be. 
For the U.S. Navy, the only truly critical launch capability is small UAVs to enable over-the-horizon 
surveillance and targeting. Our enduring presence requirement means we will almost certainly want some 
form of boat launch capability to support those missions. We may want UUV launch capability as well, 
but it likely does not meet the bar to be a minimum requirement.  
 
Minimum Requirements for a Small American Warship 
Based on the above discussion and a few common practices, the list below provides a reasonable set 
of approximate minimum requirements for any small American warship. Note that this is not our final 
design, but a simplified interpretation using current technology and standard design practices: 
• Eight LRASMs 
• SeaRAM 
• Latest generation full-sized AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite 
• Standard decoy launchers 
• Excellent optical sensor suite: 
• Visible Distributed Aperture System (DAS) 
• IR DAS 
• Visible/IR camera turret 
• Maximum affordable acoustic signature reduction 
• Appropriate reduction of other signatures to blend into civilian traffic 
• COTS navigation radar 
• Low probability of detection/intercept datalinks 
• 30-knot speed (approx.) 
• 7500+ nautical mile range 
• One 7m RHIB 
• Small UAV storage and launch accommodations 
• Traditional light gun armament 
• One 30mm autocannon 
• Two M2 Browning heavy machine guns 
It has been assumed that the likely boat launch facility is included while the more tentative UUV 
launch facility has been omitted. The range was selected to allow the ship to sortie from one island chain 
to the next and back (e.g. Guam to the Philippines) on internal fuel, and it also makes it relatively easy to 
 
 
operate over even longer distances using extra fuel bladders and/or limited refueling. Speed is not exact 
since small changes wouldn’t have a major impact, and no attempt was made to identify a displacement or 
crew complement because it is not immediately relevant to this example. 
While the above requirements are obviously distinct from any current design, they should be 
immediately recognizable as the rough outline for a fairly conventional small warship tailored to the 
needs of the United States Navy. More work would obviously need to be done to refine this into a 
finalized set of requirements, but it is close enough to analyze how this conventional design compares to 
other hypothetical budget priorities and show why we did not simply settle for this minimum 
configuration. 
 
‘Adequate’ is Not Enough 
In any discussion of hypothetical designs, it is critical to keep key alternatives and counterarguments 
in mind. In the case of small warships, the most relevant argument that might be presented is that aircraft 
can do the job better. This can take many forms of varying strength, but attacking a weaker form 
undermines the discussion. Thus, a hypothetical, purpose-built, bomber-like anti-ship aircraft will be 
considered here. The comparison with the aircraft described in this section will be used to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the ‘adequate’ warship described above and set up a discussion of how to make it 
worthwhile. 
This hypothetical aircraft would be a large, stealthy flying wing built using technology from the F-35. 
Using these electronics eliminates much of the cost of new development and eases maintenance by 
sharing logistics between this hypothetical anti-ship aircraft and the F-35. In addition, the new low-
maintenance stealth coatings will eliminate the headaches of older designs like the B-2, and the design 
would be further simplified since its mission doesn’t require extreme stealth. It only needs to be able to 
attack hostile warships before they can detect it, which is not particularly challenging given the range of 
LRASM and the sensor performance inherited from the F-35. Thus, the cost should be relatively low. 
For the sake of argument, it will be assumed this aircraft costs $300 million and carries 24 LRASMs, 
although better numbers may be possible. This compares cleanly with the small warship which would 
cost a little under $100 million and carry 8 LRASMs, so the cost per missile carried is approximately the 
same and we can focus on other performance parameters. 
The ship has three key advantages: persistence, presence, and attritability. The first two stem from the 
obvious fact that a ship can loiter much longer than an aircraft, which makes it better for keeping weapons 
on-station in wartime or demonstrating American interest by performing a variety of low-end missions in 
peacetime. The third stems from the fact that we can afford three ships for the price of one aircraft, so an 
equal investment will provide more ships and losing one costs less, assuming the crew is recovered. 
While attritability is a benefit in a high-end war, the peacetime flexibility provided by the enhanced 
persistence and presence is less of a concern in the current geopolitical environment. Finally, this ship 
may be able to provide some amphibious lift for small USMC units operating under their Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, although its inability to provide meaningful fire support will 
limit its utility if an island is contested. 
In contrast, the aircraft has numerous wartime advantages. The obvious speed advantage means the 
aircraft can respond to a developing situation and rearm much faster than ships. This further combines 
with its altitude to allow a single aircraft to survey a much wider area than the three ships can in spite of 
their persistence advantage. Furthermore, its combination of long detection range and stealthy airframe 
means the aircraft is more likely to see hostile warships before they see it, providing a major advantage 
over ships with respect to survivability and firing effectively first. Finally, thanks to its F-35 architecture, 
the aircraft will be compatible with a wide range of standard ordinance like the AGM-158 JASSM, AIM-
120 AMRAAM, AGM-88 HARM, GBU-39 SDB, and so on, allowing it to perform other missions. 
From this comparison, it is clear that those deciding which program to fund will not choose the 
‘adequate’ small warship because other programs like the aircraft described above offer a greater return 
on investment. More capability is clearly needed to make the ship worthwhile. 
 
Going From Viable to Worthwhile 
 
 
The challenge with solving this problem is that it must be done without compromising the cost and 
size of these ships. The addition of desirable features led to the size and cost growth of LCS out of the 
original Streetfighter concept. Subsequent additions to fit into the traditional concept of a frigate with the 
FFG(X) program have produced a vessel with capabilities, and by extension costs, approaching that of 
the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. 
To retain the advantages of a small warship and keep it from growing into another Burke, two 
fundamental options are available: enhanced launch/support facilities, and secondary armament 
reconfigurations. 
This section will explain how the LMACC program addresses this problem and provide the full 
design details for our baseline configuration. We have made significant enhancements to our launch and 
support facilities to improve overall utility, and have detailed plans for providing sealift support to the 
USMC during distributed operations. For the secondary armament, we took advantage of the interactions 
between technologies to provide much greater lethality against smaller surface threats and to restore the 
ability to provide robust fire support for Marines ashore at comparable cost. 
 
Launch and Support Facilities 
Before diving into how this ship will integrate with the Marines’ EABO concept, we will briefly 
circle back to the previously discussed launch facilities. UUV launch facilities, while not essential, have 
been included to provide additional flexibility at low cost, and are designed to benefit from the stern 
launch ramp required to support EABO. Furthermore, thanks to the small crew and wide beam, we were 
also able to fit an 11m RHIB to provide additional utility and transport capacity. Helicopter 
accommodations on the other hand have a major design impact even for a relatively minimal landing pad, 
especially in terms of manning for maintenance and support, so it has been omitted in favor of a topside 
UAV locker. 
While the Marines are correct to pursue dedicated transports to implement EABO, the surface 
combatant fleet can also provide limited sealift support. A DDG-51destroyer would have to provide this 
support on a not-to-interfere basis, but our ship will be an integral part of the mission. The normal 
wartime employment of these ships will see pairs sortie into the same contested littorals the Marines 
intend to operate in, so they will supplement the dedicated transport fleet by carrying light units and 
supplies. LMACC has two empty six-person cabins, plus four extra beds in the crew cabins, so a tactical 
pair can easily carry a Marine platoon between them with hot racking. These cabins will also provide 
space for detachments, and one will be equipped to serve as a brig in support of peacetime patrol and 
partnership missions. 
The other half of providing sealift support is delivering the embarked Marines ashore. Features such 
as shallow draft, pumpjet propulsion, and COTS navigation sonars will allow these ships to get very close 
to shore to facilitate rapid transfer, possibly even including swimming. Readily accessible stowage spaces 
at the forward end of the launch bay support rapid transfer of equipment and support use of the inflatable 
Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC), while oversized lower-deck cargo bays provide ample storage 
space. Finally, small boat operations have been greatly enhanced by combining a fully enclosed bay with 
a stern launch ramp to facilitate rapid Marine deployment, especially in inclement weather or at night. 
It should also be noted that the attributes which make it well-suited to supporting the Marines also 
make it well-suited to supporting Special Forces. 
 
Rethinking the Secondary Armament 
For secondary armament, we took the overall configuration back to its fundamental requirements: 
short-range small boat defense, long-range small boat defense, area land attack, precision land attack, and 
limited air defense. This allowed us to rethink our approach to those requirements and take advantage of 
the interactions between modern weapon systems to get better results than a traditional deck gun. 
The key technology that enables our layout is the unassuming Javelin Launch Tray. This adds a 
Javelin missile launcher to a standard pintle mounted weapon, and allows a loader/gunner team to 
outperform a 30mm autocannon with greater range and comparable engagement rate at greatly reduced 
weight and installation cost. While this is a useful supplementary defense on existing ships, the large 
 
 
number of installations makes LMACC an excellent escort against small swarming threats and, more 
importantly, amply satisfies the short-range small boat defense requirement without a deck gun. This may 
seem less important at first glance since these types of threats are typically associated with Iran, but China 
has already developed a small USV to perform a similar mission, making this threat relevant to the high-
end fight. Javelin also provides a limited anti-aircraft capability since it was designed to destroy 
helicopters as well as tanks. 
Since there is no need for a traditional multi-million dollar deck gun, LMACC instead mounts a 
105mm howitzer. The cased ammunition of this weapon makes it suitable for sea service, unlike the 
larger, separately-loaded 155mm version. As a traditionally towed artillery piece, it is a lightweight, low 
cost weapon ideally suited to land attack. This of course addresses longstanding concerns about naval 
gunfire, and is directly relevant to supporting the Marines. 
These two weapons fill the short-range small boat defense, area land attack, and limited air defense 
requirements, leaving long-range small boat defense and precision land attack. These two remaining 
requirements are both addressed through the addition of Spike NLOS missiles. This allows small surface 
threats to be safely engaged from over the horizon, and allows armored vehicles and other point targets to 
be precisely eliminated as well. This complements the howitzer and Javelin to provide excellent anti-boat 
capabilities and robust fire support for Marines ashore. 
The final weapon system is the Miniature Hit-To-Kill (MHTK) missile, which provides additional 
defense against low-end aerial threats like small UAVs and rockets. This further improves survivability, 
especially against swarming threats, and ensures the air defense capabilities of a deck gun are fully 
replicated. 
The result of this is a much more flexible and lethal armament with relatively low installation weight 
and cost. This makes our armament unequivocally superior to the conventional autocannon configuration 
established previously without significant design growth, and even provides major advantages over a 
larger deck gun. 
 
The LMACC Design 
Now that we have walked through the requirements and logic of our design, we will take a moment to 
provide a design summary of our baseline configuration: 
• Name: USS Shrike 
• Type: Patrol Ship, Guided missile (PCG) 
• Cost: $96.6 million 
• Displacement: 600 tons 
• Length: 214 feet 
• Beam: 29 feet (waterline) 
• Draft: 6.5 feet 
• Range: 7500+ nautical miles 
• Speed: 30 knots 
• two steerable, reversible pumpjets with intake screen 
• Integrated electric propulsion 
• Diesel engines 
• Crew: 15 (31 beds) 
• Armament: 
• Eight LRASMs 
• SeaRAM 
• Seven Javelin pintle mounts 
• One Javelin launch tray per mount 
• Ten stored missiles per mount 
• Either a M2 Browning or Mk 47 AGL per mount 
• 105mm howitzer 
• 36 Spike NLOS missiles 
• 64 Miniature Hit-To-Kill Missiles 
 
 
• COMBATSS-21 combat management system 
• Latest generation full-sized AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite 
• Standard decoy launchers 
• Excellent optical sensor suite: 
• Visible Distributed Aperture System (DAS) 
• IR DAS 
• Visible/IR camera turret 
• COTS navigation sonar 
• Maximum affordable acoustic signature reduction 
• Appropriate reduction of other signatures to blend into civilian traffic 
• COTS navigation radar 
• L3Harris Falcon III® RF-7800W non-line of sight radio 
• Multifunction Advanced Datalink (MADL) 
• Aft launch bay 
• One 11m RHIB 
• One 11m long UUV slot (multiple UUV transportation possible) 
• Bay door doubles as launch ramp 
• Small topside UAV storage and launch accommodations 
This maintains the previously established minimum requirements while integrating the additional 
features discussed. 
Circling back to the comparison with the hypothetical anti-ship aircraft, these low cost enhancements 
have added numerous advantages over the ‘adequate’ design. In addition to the previous advantages of 
persistence, presence, and attritability, it can now operate UUVs, transport Marines, provide surface fire 
support, and destroy small boat swarms. This makes the ship a much more useful platform with the 
flexibility to adapt to an uncertain future, and gives procurement officials a good reason to select it over 
the aircraft. This clear utility and economic viability is the hallmark of well-thought-out requirements, and 
makes this design, in our opinion, viable for American service. 
It should be remembered that this information is only applicable to the baseline configuration. The 
other variants add a ten-foot hull segment to add special mission capabilities and will have increased costs 
as a result. 
 
Automation and Manning 
From a systems perspective, the core concept for this ship is that it will be built like a large USV. 
Since the automated systems can notify the crew when action is needed, traditional watches are 
unnecessary and significant crew reductions are possible. Furthermore, since the ship’s systems will be 
designed to operate with minimal intervention as expected of a USV, there will, in theory, be very little 
need for maintenance. However, there will be people on hand to correct any problems that do occur, 
unlike a full USV. Thus, from a systems perspective, this will allow LMACC to bridge the gap to 
autonomy because it keeps people on board while operating like an autonomous vessel. As such, a fleet of 
these ships will allow us to safely build a large body of operational knowledge and inform our approach 
to future USVs and human-machine teaming. 
We intend to man these ships with a 15-person crew lead by a Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI). 
These tactical experts will be ideally suited to lead their ships and attendant packs of unmanned vessels to 
victory in the most challenging circumstances, and take the initiative when cut off from external 
command. They will lay traps, strike targets ashore, and hunt down hostile warships while confounding 
the enemy’s ability to respond by vanishing into civilian traffic. 
While our work indicates a crew of 15 is appropriate to manage the weapons, sensors, and drones, we 
are acutely aware of the uncertainty associated with this novel manning concept and the need to bring 
aboard additional personnel for special missions. As such, the ship has been designed with five, six-
person cabins, plus a single cabin for the commanding officer, to provide ample berthing. Two of those 
cabins are notionally intended to be used for non-crew personnel such as Marines conducting EABO 
deployments, Coast Guard law enforcement detachments, or brig space. That leaves free beds for four 
 
 
more crewmembers with no meaningful impact, and the crew could be further enlarged by using one or 
both of those cabins if needed. Even in the worst-case scenario, 31 beds allow for three more crew than 
the existing Cyclone-class patrol ship, without hot racking. This effectively eliminates the risks associated 
with a smaller crew by allowing the ship to comfortably carry a traditional full complement if required. 
 
Concepts of Operation 
These ships are intended to fight forward to defend or retake island chains. The design emphasizes 
fighting in complex environments by disappearing into civilian traffic and littoral clutter. These ships will 
rely on passive sensors to complicate the enemy’s target identification problem and maximize the chance 
of achieving tactical surprise. The basic wartime operational unit will be a tactical pair, consisting of 
either two of the basic short-hull ships, or one basic design and one specialized variant. These pairs will 
work closely with unmanned vessels and Marines ashore to deny the area to the enemy, degrade hostile 
defenses, and clear the way for heavier units. They will also provide light sealift and logistics support to 
small, lightly equipped Marine units. Note that while we have done extensive work on tactics, deployment 
strategies, and cooperation with the existing leviathan navy, much of that material is not publicly 
releasable and will not be further discussed here. That said, much of this is built on the work of our 
colleague, the late Capt. Wayne Hughes, so members of the public interested in learning more are 
encouraged to read his work. 
In peacetime, these ships will provide a cost effective asset for patrol, partnership, and deterrence 
missions. Since these ships are much cheaper than even frigates, they will be a better choice for 
countering piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and other illicit activity, allowing more 
expensive ships to focus on missions and training which fully exploit their capabilities. They will also 
enable more effective joint training with our smaller partners whose fleets are closely matched to these 
ships. This is particularly relevant in the South China Sea and Western Pacific where there is a need to 
carry foreign coast guard detachments for joint patrols and visit many small, primitive ports to reassure 
our friends and deter China. This will also substantially improve the readiness and performance of our 
fleet by reducing the workload on high-end assets, and offering early command billets to help develop 
young officers. 
Finally, fleet integration is greatly simplified by the operational similarity of this PCG to the Cyclone-
class PC. LMACC can serve as a drop-in replacement for the Cyclone at similar cost, so there is no 
operational risk. We could hand one of these ships to the fleet today and they’d be able to put it to work 
immediately by treating it like a Cyclone while the Surface Development Squadron refines the more 
advanced tactics developed by the Naval Postgraduate School. This makes it possible to jump 
immediately to serial production if desired, although building a prototype first would reduce risk at the 
cost of delaying its entry into service. 
 
Ship Variants 
We have plans for several special mission variants. In keeping with the Navy’s historical tradition of 
naming small ships after birds, they have all been given bird names. The baseline LMACC variant, 
the Shrike, has already been discussed, and two additional variants have been fleshed out, the anti-
aircraft Falcon and the anti-submarine Osprey, both of which add new capabilities with a ten-foot hull 
extension. 
It is difficult to discuss the details of the Falcon’s operation publicly, but it adds a new sensor and a 
tactical-length Mk 41 VLS module to destroy hostile maritime patrol aircraft before they can distinguish 
it from civilian traffic. This will protect these ships from the single greatest threat to them, hostile aircraft, 
and substantially improve their ability to operate within hostile A2/AD systems. 
The Osprey variant, on the other hand, is relatively simple and is built to maximize the impact of 
USV-mounted sensors. The primary addition is eight new angled launch cells for Tomahawk cruise 
missiles modified to carry a lightweight torpedo. This allows a very small number of these ships to 
greatly improve our ability to deter and defeat submarines, since they can quickly strike targets detected 
by offboard sensors from hundreds of miles away. Furthermore, since Tomahawk is a well-established 
weapon fielded across the fleet, this will allow us to add this capability across our surface combatant fleet, 
 
 
and provide a way to recycle obsolete Tomahawks when we inevitably move on to other weapons. 
Finally, this variant is rounded out by a hull-mounted passive sonar and four fixed torpedo tubes for self-
defense, since it is expected to operate in areas with elevated submarine risk. 
Two additional variants have been considered. The first is a drone mothership which adds a UUV 
handling module to field large numbers of UUVs, and may also modify the aft launch bay to carry two 
boats or USVs. The second is a coast guard variant which replaces most of the missiles with a dedicated 
sickbay, brig, and secure contraband storage to turn it into a bigger, more capable version of the Sentinel-
class cutter, although these capabilities could also be added in a hull segment if an export customer wants 
to retain the missiles. 
 
Program Status 
Our requirements and top-level engineering are complete. The only major task remaining is to finalize 
our hullform, and we can do that in parallel with shipyard and supplier selection. Almost all the 
technology we have selected is fielded. The remaining technologies are closely based on fielded systems, 
and the baseline Shrike will still be combat effective if delays force it to deploy before these technologies 
are ready. Since the Naval Postgraduate School is outside the traditional shipbuilding bureaucracy, we 
have significant flexibility in our path forward to production. We could do anything from traditional 
acquisition to building this under the umbrella of a research project outside all existing acquisition 
structures, as was done with TACPOD, so we can take whatever approach is most acceptable to Congress 
and the Navy. 
http://cimsec.org/lifting-the-veil-on-the-lightly-manned-surface-combatant/44650 
 





To Secure the Election: Tame the Russian Bear in Cyberspace 
(Council on Foreign Relations 13 July 20) … Dr. Scott Jasper, Naval Postgraduate School Lecturer 
On June 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the United States as a country gripped by a 
“deep internal crisis” due to the refusal by opponents of President Trump to accept his “obvious” 2016 
election victory and his legitimacy as leader. Meanwhile, Russian English language outlets pushed a 
common theme that protests and fires in the United States over racial injustice were a coup or uprising 
staged by the “Deep State” against the Trump administration. These public messages, combined with 
Russia’s aggressive social media influence campaigns and targeted cyber operations, aim to sow division 
in American society and affect the upcoming presidential election. 
While Chinese and Iranian state hackers have recently been caught targeting the presidential 
campaigns of both major U.S. political parties, U.S. intelligence officials have singled out Russian efforts 
in particular. For example, in January, security experts revealed the Russian military’s efforts to hack into 
the Ukrainian gas company Burisma to find information on Hunter Biden in order to smear former Vice 
President Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate for president. Russian cyber actors have also 
been renewing their efforts from the 2016 presidential election to hack voter databases and election 
infrastructure, and should be expected to target mail-in ballot systems. Despite investments in security, IT 
departments in election offices are no match for professional Russian hackers. Facebook has also 
admitted that the Internet Research Agency, a Russian company that carries out online influence 
operations, is improving its methods to bypass the platform’s disinformation filters. 
U.S. agencies have previously attempted to respond to Russian election interference after it has 
occurred. Following the hacking of the Democratic National Committee’s (DNC) servers during the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, the investigation led by Special Counsel Robert Mueller yielded criminal 
indictments for Russian military operatives. In addition, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has 
sanctioned Russian cyber operatives, and even Russian oligarchs, along with their companies. 
 
 
Nonetheless, indicting Russian hackers has not deterred Russian election interference, and sanctions have 
even backfired after producing unexpected consequences, like causing the global price of aluminum 
to soar. 
The United States has also broadly responded to malicious Russian cyber activity with a name and 
shame strategy, exemplified by its condemnation of Russia for cyberattacks targeting Georgia in October. 
This strategy tries to enforce and build international consensus for rules for responsible state behavior but 
falls short of imposing costs that change Russia’s strategic calculus. Alternatively, the U.S. military is 
capable of achieving this by targeting the sources of Russian cyber operations in Russia’s cyber territory; 
General Paul Nakasone, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, recently hinted at this prospect when he 
told Congress that “My top priority is a safe and secure election that is free from foreign influence.” 
Cyber Command has been empowered by relaxed rules and new authorities, which have enabled it to 
conduct persistent engagement in cyberspace against foreign adversaries, including Russia. The strategy 
leverages a defend forward approach, which uses network exploitation, cyber-enabled influence 
operations, and degrading cyberattacks in day-to-day efforts to disrupt and deter foreign cyber operations. 
The command tested this strategy during the 2018 U.S. midterm election. Using emails, pop-ups, text, and 
direct messages, U.S. operatives told Russian social media trolls spreading disinformation that they had 
been identified. They also messaged hackers working for Russian military intelligence. The trolls 
persisted, and on Election Day, and for a few days during the vote count, Cyber Command took Internet 
Research Agency servers offline by blocking their internet access. U.S. senators from both political 
parties praised the operation, but the Russian Federal News Agency said the attack “did not stop work 
entirely.” 
During this time, the command also sent teams to several European countries to find and expose 
Russian hacking tools on their networks. Moreover, as part of its malware inoculation initiative, it 
uploaded Russian military-grade malware to VirusTotal, a private website for crowdsourcing threat 
analysis. These efforts to confront Russian cyber activity before the election appear to have been 
successful, as the Department of Homeland Security reported that there were no indications of 
compromise in election infrastructure and minimal disinformation was spotted around Election Day. 
As the 2020 election approaches, the National Security Agency, also led by General Nakasone, has 
continued to disclose Russian threat information publicly to defend U.S. networks. For example, a 
recent advisory detailed innovative email exploitation tactics of Sandworm, a Russian military cyber unit 
blamed for cyberattacks targeting energy companies in Ukraine. 
Nonetheless, given the range of possible Russian tactics to interfere in this year’s election, Cyber 
Command will have to consider tougher methods to impose costs that change Russian behavior. Open 
source reports indicate that the command has contemplated its own form of information warfare. This 
could include targeting senior Russian officials and business elites with limited cyber operations that 
show access to sensitive personal accounts and the capability to inflict cost if election interference 
continues.  
As it weighs its options, Cyber Command will undoubtedly conduct thorough planning and risk 
assessments that consider the possibility of Russian retaliation and discovery or reuse of exploits that the 
command uses against it. That said, it will continue its strategy of persistent engagement and even explore 
new, more punishing measures to undermine Russian interference in the upcoming U.S. election. This 












Four Years On, a Cloud of Mystery Still Surrounds Turkey’s July 15 Coup 
(Ahvalnews.com 14 July 20) … Hot Pursuit 
Four years have passed since the military coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in Turkey, but there is still a 
lot of controversy and discussion over the events that occurred that day, said Ryan Gingeras, an expert on 
Turkish, Balkan and Middle East history, in a podcast with Ahval's Editor-in-Chief Yavuz Baydar and its 
English Editor Ilhan Tanır. 
Gingeras, a professor at the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California, recalls how he was stunned by the news of the Turkish military taking over the 
Bosporus Bridge in Istanbul on a Friday evening – the busiest time of the week – using mostly army 
cadets. 
At the same time, the putschists commandeered and began flying more than two dozen F-16 fighter 
jets and other military aircraft, according to the main legal indictment against alleged coup plotters based 
at Ankara’s Akıncı airbase. Planes screamed over the capital’s skyline, giving millions of its residents a 
taste of what it might be subject to a full-scale war.  
Gingeras characterized the coup attempt as "bewildering" as it appeared to be aimed at forcing ''the 
civilian authorities to cede control while terrorizing large numbers of people”. 
More than 130,000 public workers were dismissed in the aftermath of the failed putsch. Thousands 
were arrested and jailed. Most were accused of links to the Fethullah Gülen movement, which the 
government immediately blamed for masterminding the coup. 
Gingeras said that the failed putsch appeared to underscore and amplify already existing trends in 
Turkish politics and society. 
"It is very clear that there is a great deal of continuity in terms of events, before and after the coup 
attempt, mostly defined by upward trajectory by the intensification of different trends," he said. 
The parliamentary elections of June 7, 2015 were a defining moment that preceded the failed coup, 
according to Baydar. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost 
its legislative majority at the polls, while the predominantly Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) 
passed the electoral threshold required to enter parliament, winning 80 seats. 
"At that point, I think Erdoğan realized that he is on his way to losing his power if it goes on," Baydar 
said. 
"There was also quite a discontent among the generals in the aftermath of that election. We know this 
from various analysis and reports," he said. 
Public discontent and authoritarianism in Turkey had already increased sharply during the 2013 Gezi 
protests, which erupted after a group of environmentalists sought to protect a tiny park from being 
bulldozed in Taksim, in the heart of Istanbul. The protests quickly spread to all major cities and towns 
across Turkey and turned into a nationwide demonstration against Erdoğan and the pressure he was 
imposing on people's lifestyles. A subsequent crackdown by police, directly ordered by the president, was 
brutal and still reverberates in much of society today. 
Erdoğan became embroiled in a battle against the Gülen movement the same year, following 
allegations of corruption against the president’s family, friends and allies. Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen, 
the leader of the movement, were allies themselves up until late 2013 against a common enemy; Turkey's 
elites in the bureaucracy, military and other institutions who were loyal to a Kemalist doctrine inspired by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s secular founder and first president. But once victory was declared over 
Turkey 'old elite', the two powerful Islamist groups began fighting each other over the spoils. 
Ahval's Baydar said that nobody knows much more about the details of the failed coup today than 
they did four years ago. 
A parliamentary commission had suspended its work on a report about the coup attempt abruptly in 
2017 when Erdoğan expressed his disapproval for the deepening investigations. 
Many questions were lingering around the events that occurred during the night of the coup, including 
what happened at the Akıncı air base in Ankara – later renamed Mürted, or “the Apostate” in Turkish, 
from where the attempt was allegedly directed. Then-Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar and the head of 
national intelligence, Hakan Fidan, never testified to the commission to shed more light on what 
happened that night. 
 
 
Opposition parties opposed the findings of the parliamentary report, which were announced in May 
2017 but never released publicly. 
The committee’s chairman, a deputy from Erdoğan’s ruling party, announced that the report found 
that the Gülen movement was to blame for the coup. But additions by the main opposition Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), which reportedly included further details and questions surrounding the events and 
links between Gülen and the government, were not accepted. There were still questions over the report’s 
whereabouts today, Baydar said. 
Gingeras said he did not have a strong opinion about what motivated the coup plotters, but it was 
clear that the public was required to go along with the official narrative, which has been preserved ever 
since. 
"Subsequent events clearly in terms of investigations, purges enacted and politicization of the event to 
this day made it fit to the original conclusions," Gingeras said. 
Gingeras disagreed with Baydar that the government may have had prior knowledge of the coup plot 
and that Erdoğan could have exploited it for his own political purposes. Gingeras said he had not seen 
sufficient evidence to support this claim, though there were some possible indications that a coup was 
occurring earlier that day. 
The prevailing narrative about the Gülenists' involvement in the coup appears to be accurate, 
Gingeras said. But it was still open to question whether the group organized and carried out the entire 
coup themselves, he said. 
There could have been a lot of different actors involved, Gingeras said. 
Baydar said there were still question marks over whether the Gülenists masterminded the coup or 
whether the government had prior knowledge of the attempt, which then enabled them to engineer the 
outcome. 
It would not have been difficult for the intelligence services to infiltrate and spy on the Gülenists, 
who were a conservative Muslim group in Turkey, Baydar said. He said that several commentaries 
written by pro-government columnists in the run-up to the failed putsch suggested that the government 
may have had prior knowledge of the plans. 
Baydar said that the scale of the coup attempt and its alleged composition did not fully convince him 
that it was authentic. 
High-ranking military officials were not involved in the plot - it was mostly orchestrated by colonels, 
lieutenants and a small group of one-star generals - and only between 5 percent and 7 percent of the army 
participated, Baydar said. 
The government's subsequent response, when it immediately purged almost half of the one- to four-
star generals in the Turkish army, was "baffling", Baydar said. 
Gingeras said that the purge focused on officers who received training at U.S. military institutions. A 
new echelon of military officers more aligned with senior civilian officials rose to replace them, he said. 
Gingeras said Akar, who is now defense minister, had sought to rebuild the military by placing people in 
positions of authority according to personal preference and loyalty, rather than qualification alone. 
Baydar said Erdoğan managed the military extremely skilfully in the aftermath of the coup attempt. 
He also pushed his political opponents into a corner by organising the Yenikapi Unity Rally, a mass 
gathering in Istanbul, just weeks afterward, which lay the foundation for the purges to come, Baydar said. 
https://ahvalnews.com/coup-attempt/four-years-cloud-mystery-still-surrounds-turkeys-july-15-coup 
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Greta Marlatt Wins Librarian of the Year Award 
(Center for Homeland Defense and Security 14 July 20) 
Greta Marlatt is widely known for her work with the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) and 
Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Around campus, she’s also known as the 
definitive source for delicious chocolate treats—which she often has displayed in a bowl in her office to 
 
 
share with the many guests who frequently visit her. But now, she has a new title: 2019 Federal Librarian 
of the Year. 
Marlatt was notified of the prestigious award from the Library of Congress Federal Library and 
Information Network (FEDLINK) in late June 2020. The FEDLINK awards are established to recognize 
the many innovative ways that federal libraries, librarians, and library technicians fulfill the information 
demands of the government, business, and scholarly communities. Federal libraries and staff throughout 
the United States and abroad compete for the annual awards. The award affirms her dedication to 
helping Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) students, alumni, faculty, and staff solve 
complex research issues. But the award also recognizes her contributions as the Outreach & Academic 
Support Manager at the NPS Dudley Knox Library. Predictably humble, Marlatt was surprised to receive 
the award. “I am honored to receive this award over my federal peers who all do an outstanding job on a 
daily basis,” she said. “I am also the third NPS librarian to receive it, so am especially grateful that the 
Dudley Knox Library is able to continue the tradition.” Past winners include Eleanor Uhlinger (2009) and 
Lillian Woon-Gassie (2003). 
FEDLINK specifically cited her instruction to Defense Analysis, National Security, CHDS, the 
Institute for Global Security, and the delivery of courses in citation management and bibliographic 
instruction as factors that improve data science research and education in support of the combat 
effectiveness of the Naval service. In 2019, Marlatt headed an important library renovation and collection 
relocation space-planning effort to remove barriers to resources while creating learner-centered physical 
and virtual spaces. She managed $2 million in library acquisitions, curated more than 30 LibGuides in the 
areas of congressional information, area studies, military information and conflict, and security studies, 
and responded to 750 off-desk reference questions. 
Marlatt began working at NPS in September 1994 and has been a part of CHDS-HSDL since its 
inception in 2002. “I was there from the beginning, at the discussions regarding creating the Center,” she 
added. “I was in some of the initial meetings with Lacy Suiter, Darrell Darnell, Vince Cable, Paul 
Stockton, and others. Paul felt the Center needed to have what is now the Homeland Security Digital 
Library.” While that may seem like a long time, time flies when you love what you do. The award honors 
her contributions in 2019, which admittedly feels like a long time ago—due to the effects of the COVID-
10 pandemic on everyday life. “I am one of three library staff designated as essential and so I work in the 
library every day. As well as doing my regular work, we are providing scanning, printing, and check-out 
services since the building isn’t open as well as doing a lot of building-related functions,” she said. 
So far in 2020, Marlatt has contributed to a handful of COVID-19 projects, in addition to her regular 
work with faculty and students. “At the request of an FDNY task force, I also prepared a bibliography of 
NPS theses and research related to pandemics, epidemic, and influenza,” she shared. “I also responded to 
a congressional request asking for information about economic recovery related to pandemics.” Two of 
the HSDL projects have already been published and are gaining traction: the COVID-19 Special 
Collection and the Resource Archive. The HSDL Special Collection contains over 5,500 resources related 
to issues associated with the coronavirus disease and pandemics. The HSDL Resource Archive brings 
together documents from agencies and organizations that capture the environment, debates, and hard 
realities affecting governmental and public health policy decisions in preparedness, response, and 
recovery. Users can browse by categories in an easily accessible interface or do an advanced search on the 
HSDL website for specific topics, publishers, or other criteria. 
Marlatt also runs a personal blog—aptly named Greta’s Gouge. She updates it regularly with timely 
information on security studies, homeland security, intelligence, and special operations. 
This is not the first time Marlatt has received recognition for her amazing work. She has left an 
undeniable mark on the field, authoring numerous academic articles and gleaning honors ranging from 
a 2012 New York Times “I Love My Librarian” award to the Navy’s Meritorious and Superior Civilian 
Service Awards. In 2016, she was honored with the NPS Lieutenant Commander David L. Williams 
Outstanding Instructor Award—which is named after an NPS alumnus who was killed in the September 
11 attack on the Pentagon in 2001. “The I Love My Librarian award and the FEDLINK award both mean 
a lot since they are awarded at a national level and are related to my peer groups,” she revealed. “But I 
also had the honor of receiving the student Cohort Impact award and that means even more to me because 
 
 
supporting our students is my primary goal and what I love doing the most. It’s about teaching them how 
to research and find quality information because as they write their theses, they are writing about 
important topics, not just checking a box. They are writing about real-world issues and trying to make a 
difference.” 
Speaking of loving her job and making an impact on CHDS programs, Marlatt often gets to 
participate in specialized events and training that involve students and alumni. When discussing an FDNY 
Academy event, she mentioned “I had the chance to attend their alumni events and both times we had the 
opportunity to go to ‘the Rock,’ their training facility. We got to participate in the same kind of training 
they go through and experience it first-hand. Those types of events are a lot of fun and also very 
educational.” It’s another example of her unmatched ability to guide CHDS students through the maze of 
research and writing demands required by the master’s degree program. And further proof that she is the 
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Military Expert Sees Rise of Pandemics and Climate Change 
(Livermore Independent 16 July 20) … Jeff Garberson 
In an online talk scheduled for next Wednesday evening, nationally known defense expert John 
Arquilla will discuss the rise of pandemics and climate change among issues that now must be considered 
in a rapidly evolving U.S. national security picture. 
Arquilla, a distinguished professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
will give his talk against a backdrop of increasing military challenges to the U.S. from China and Russia. 
The event was originally scheduled to take place before a live audience in March as part of the Rae 
Dorough Speaker Series at Livermore’s Bankhead Theater. 
For years, he argued that the American military should move away from large, expensive defense 
platforms, like aircraft carriers, to focus on smaller, more nimble forces. 
That is one of the themes he will pursue in his talk next week, he said in an interview last week. He 
also believes “we have to take a broader view of national security” given the current impact of the 
coronavirus pandemic and long-term changes generated by a warming climate. 
Today’s pandemic is only one of several to occur in recent decades as “major diseases moved from 
the animal world to human beings,” he said. 
As examples, he cited AIDS and two other coronavirus epidemics, MERS (middle eastern respiratory 
syndrome) and SARS (severe acquired respiratory syndrome.) 
“Securing the country against pandemic spread needs to be taken far more seriously,” he said. 
As for climate change, he indicated the warming of the earth is having a significant impact on 
international rivalries. Above the Arctic Circle, for example, oceans whose ice cover has melted are now 
navigable, “creating a new competition for sovereignty and resources. That has strategic implications as 
well.” 
At the same time, his talk will also consider “traditional issues” of national security. 
“We are spending $2 billion every day on American defense,” Arquilla said. “How do we know we 
are spending it well?” 
He questions the value of investing $1 trillion on development and operation of a new, piloted fighter 
plane at a time when it can be outperformed by robotic and remotely piloted aircraft. 
Similarly, he has been critical of spending tens of billions of dollars on new aircraft carriers when 
“hypersonic missiles are holding aircraft carriers at tremendous risk.” 
He notes Dwight Eisenhower’s 1961 caution about a “military-industrial complex,” an informal 
alliance between the military and its industrial suppliers that Eisenhower foresaw as a vested interest 
influencing public policy. 
 
 
Arquilla worries that military spending today may be directed toward “a small number of defense 
contractors who are highly dependent on these old systems that they want to keep making … fighter 
aircraft for pilots and aircraft carriers (and) main battle tanks at a time when these systems may be 
becoming obsolete.” 
At the strategic level, he questions some of the U.S. decisions to intervene in other countries. 
“That has proved over the past two decades to be exceptionally costly and largely ruinous for the 
countries in which we have intervened,” he continued. 
He cites Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen as examples. 
In Yemen, he said, “We supported Saudi intervention … which has turned that very sad land into the 
world’s charnel house.” 
He further stated that the U.S. needs to exercise “much greater prudence” in overseas commitments. 
“We need to take a strategic appetite suppressant when it comes to interventions,” Arquilla said. 
Arquilla is the author of several books including “From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in 
Ancient and Modern Times”; “Worst Enemy”; and “Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits.” His latest book is 
“Why the Axis Lost; An Analysis of Strategic Errors. 
He was a consultant to senior military commanders during Operation Desert Storm and the Kosovo 
War. In 2011, he served on a small team working directly for President Obama whose task was to find 
“new directions for American defense.” 
He is the author of more than 100 articles dealing with a wide range of topics in military and security 
affairs, appearing in academic journals and in general publications like The New York Times, Foreign 
Policy Magazine and Atlantic Monthly. 
His talk is scheduled to begin at 7:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 22. It is sponsored by Quest Science 
Center 2.0, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Towne Center 
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Listen: How the Oil Wars Myth Continues to Shape US Foreign Policy 
(S&P Global 20 July 20) … Meghan Gordon 
US President Donald Trump has used the phrase "take the oil" many times, both as a candidate to 
criticize previous administrations' strategies in Iraq and while in the White House when discussing Syria. 
The idea is rooted in the belief that countries have gone to war in the past to grab natural resources, 
especially oil. 
This week's guest scrutinized that idea in her new book, "The Oil Wars Myth." 
Emily Meierding, an assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, analyzed more than 
600 international military disputes between 1912 and 2010, and determined that classic oil wars are a 
myth. 
She argues this myth creates a collective intellectual blind spot that continues to shape 
contemporary foreign policy choices. 
We talk about how the idea of oil wars shapes US foreign policy, how the global shift toward oil 
supply abundance changes this debate, and how current low oil revenues could pose security risks and 









COVID-19, Information and the Deep Structure of the International System 
(The Cypher Brief 20 July 20) … Dr. Leo Blanken, Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor of Defense 
Analysis 
The COVID19 crisis comes at a time when the existing structure of the Globalized Liberal system is 
under extreme stress. What do conflicting messaging strategies around the origins of the pandemic tell us 
about the trajectory of the international order? 
It seems as if the world is moving from a place of cooperation to one of competition and mutual 
recrimination: from security, to economics, to the environment. The fact that this is even occurring in the 
realm of global health in the midst of the greatest medical crisis of the last 100 years is particularly 
ominous. Another way to succinctly capture this inflection point is to ask whether the international 
system is changing from a place best described by Liberalism, to a place best described by Realism? As 
the COVID19 crisis continues to unfold, will it serve to rally the global community back towards a place 
of integration and collective action? Or will it serve as a midwife for further conflict and mistrust? 
Currently, it seems to be heading towards the latter as state actors are mobilizing their instruments of 
power to strategically shape the narrative of COVID19’s origin and spread. As actors subordinate “truth” 
(as problematic a term as that may be) about the pandemic under their grand strategies, the response to 
this crisis may be a harbinger of the nature of the international system to come. 
The essay proceeds as follows. First, we must understand how Liberalism and Realism differ: the core 
distinction being how they see states as valuing relative or absolute gains. This concept is crucial for 
understanding the likelihood of cooperation or conflict across multiple domains of international 
interaction. We then turn to the issue of information – how the weaponization of information reflects the 
trajectory of the deeper structure of the international system. Finally, if it is true that COVID19 is 
becoming fodder for states’ information operations, what is to be done? 
Liberalism and Realism are the two foundational constructs for explaining the functioning of the 
international system. These theories – particularly in their modern articulations – are differences in degree 
rather than in kind. Both recognize the anarchic nature of the international system and assume the self-
interested nature of nation states. Where the two schools of thought diverge is in the question of what 
types of gains are valued by these actors: absolute or relative? For Liberals, states focus on absolute gains. 
In other words, they consider options and choose the ones in which they achieve the greatest gains 
(regardless of how other actors do). For Realists, however, actors focus on relative gains. When they 
consider options, they are chiefly concerned with how each option would benefit them in relation to how 
it would benefit rivals. In fact, under Realism, an attractive option may even make one worse off (in an 
absolute sense), as long as it leaves a rival in an even poorer position – a truly “beggar thy neighbor” 
approach to foreign policy. A world in which actors value absolute gains creates wide-ranging space for 
cooperation in which consumers, producers and market mechanisms take precedence. A world in which 
actors value relative gains sets the stage for bitter competition, in which all aspects of a nation’s activity – 
military, economic, and informational – become subordinated to the needs of the state. 
The latest globalization enterprise was a child of Liberal thinking. The rising tide of unfettered global 
economic activity was intended to raise all boats, with little thought for national machinations that states 
might weave into it. The desired end-state was to have all factors of production used as efficiently as 
possible to create the greatest amount of goods and services to which all consumers around the world 
would have access at the cheapest possible prices. Despite the intentions of its champions to create a 
planet-spanning “level playing field”, globalization instead seems to have created rich opportunities for 
states to gain advantage through strategic manipulation. China has been notably successful at turning 
previously cooperative realms into competitive spaces for its wide-ranging grand strategy. The architects 
of globalization had hoped that the enterprise would eventually acculturate recalcitrant states to the 
Liberal worldview, but operating in that space seems to have allowed such actors to perfect the tools for 
furthering their strategic aims. 
Information has become the latest realm in which revisionist states have turned previously 
cooperative spaces – characterized as spaces where absolute gains could be enjoyed by all actors – into 
realms of competition. One important enabler for this has been the rise of social media. As those media 
sources that have traditionally provided responsible journalism  – such as respected print newspapers – 
 
 
get squeezed by changing technology, we have seen the rise of partisan, unregulated, and often disturbing 
outlets flooding the new information space. Many of these sources tend to prey on preexisting anxieties, 
prejudice, and social divisions to turn the collective understanding of the world from a single “research 
field” that is based on logic and supporting evidence, to a fragmentation of irreconcilable “belief fields” 
that are based on emotion, prejudice, or appeal to arbitrary values. In 1974, Ronald Coase noted this 
vulnerability within Liberalism. Framed as a paradox, he questioned as to why the “marketplace of ideas” 
remains a highly unregulated market, while the markets for goods and services are highly regulated. 
Within the United States, for example, the Food and Drug Administration carefully protects you from 
being poisoned by unsafe food, but there are few regulatory mechanisms to protect you from pernicious 
information sources. At the international level? All bets are off. COVID-19 provides the perfect petri dish 
for the marriage of unregulated, global information sources and state strategies to distort the truth. 
The point here is not to argue for a loosening or tightening of First Amendment rights, but rather to 
point out that a barely-regulated “marketplace of ideas” within the United States, as opposed to the 
highly-regulated information-space of an authoritarian state such as the PRC creates the perfect battlefield 
for the type of asymmetric warfare we see emerging around COVID-19 information. In other words, if 
there is heterogeneity among unit-level actors in regards to vulnerability to the manipulation of 
information, then a domain for competition (and asymmetric advantages to be had within that domain) 
arises. In fact, if one assumes that operations in this space are characterized by varying cost, then it opens 
the door for competitive strategies – the wearing down of an opponent who is on the wrong side of the 
cost equation. Have the Chinese designed such a competitive strategy for shaping narratives? Does it cost 
less for them to generate a mistruth than for the United States to counter it? If so, this is a problem. 
What is to be done? If the “truth” regarding the culpability for COVID-19’s origin and spread is 
becoming weaponized by states, what does it mean for the international system and how should the US 
respond? In terms of the international system, this may serve as another nail in the coffin for the global 
Liberal enterprise of the last three decades. If states cannot rally to collaboratively combat the global 
pandemic itself, it seems that we are heading towards a more “nasty and brutish” era of international 
affairs. For the United States to revive the globalist agenda it had spearheaded for so long, it would have 
to double down on investing in international institutions and buttressing international norms regarding 
transparency and shared empathy. Given recent US policy choices, this does not seem to be in the cards. 
What remains then, would be state-level remedies to the problem. These could include regulation of 
private-sector information platforms, policy changes, and more robust strategies for US government 
information operations entities. Crafting these instruments for global competition in the information space 
may help to solve the immediate challenges posed by the COVID-19 propaganda war but is also a signal 









Dr. Allen Harper Joins T-Rex Solutions as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity 
(Security Magazine 14 July 20) 
T-Rex Solutions, LLC announced Marine Corps veteran, entrepreneur and cybersecurity executive 
Dr. Allen Harper joined the organization as Executive Vice President of Cybersecurity. Dr. Harper will 
lead the company’s delivery of secure cloud services to the Federal government. 
“We’re thrilled Dr. Harper is joining our team to help us continue to modernize government’s largest 
systems and protect its most valuable data.” said T-Rex CEO Seth Moore. “As we work to build, secure, 
and integrate mission-critical systems, we will look to Allen’s leadership and commitment to the mission 
to relentlessly drive innovation.” 
 
 
Dr. Harper joins T-Rex after a career serving in the military and leading in industry and academia. As 
an officer in the Marine Corps, Dr. Harper led IT and cybersecurity in Western Iraq before retirement. He 
began a cybersecurity consulting business which was acquired in six years, where he specialized in ethical 
hacking, offensive security, penetration testing and reverse engineering. He most recently served as the 
department chair and cyber program director at Liberty University. 
“I look forward to building on T-Rex’s success with the 2020 Decennial Census to expand our 
offerings and enhance Federal agencies’ cybersecurity posture,” said Harper. “I bring an attacker’s 
mindset and a proactive cybersecurity approach to inform how we help agencies move critical services 
and assets to the cloud securely.” 
Dr. Harper authored six best-selling books and is the lead author of the Gray Hat Hacking series, now 
in 5th edition. Dr. Harper graduated with a bachelor’s degree in science in computer engineering from 
North Carolina State University, a master’s degree of science in computer science and information 
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Candidate Q&A: Andrew Miller, Skagit PUD Board of Commissioners 
(goSkagit.com 15 July 20) … Richard Walker 
Name: Andrew Miller 
Party Preference: None stated 
Age: 44 
Residence: Mount Vernon 
Occupation: Farmer, CEO 
Education: Juris Doctorate, Seattle University School of Law; MBA, Pacific Lutheran University; MA in 
Organizational Leadership, Gonzaga University; MA in Strategic Studies, Naval Postgraduate School; 
BS, Excelsior College. 
Elected offices held: None 
Community involvement: Viva Farms Board vice president; Anacortes Economic Development 
Committee; Anacortes Marine Trades Committee; Skagit Innovation Partnership Zone Committee 
Member; former Scoutmaster and Skagit District Training Committee chair, Boy Scouts of America. 
Campaign website: millerforskagitpud.com 
Why are you running for office? Water is at the heart of what makes the quality of life in Skagit County 
so remarkable. It drives nearly every aspect of the environmental, ecological, and economic benefits that 
we enjoy and we need to make sure that we’ve got the absolute best team on the field at the PUD. Our 
community needs elected officials that are committed to creatively and constructively tackling the 
challenges facing households and businesses in Skagit County. I have spent my career serving our country 
and community and solving problems at the highest levels of industry and I look forward to bringing that 
experience to the PUD. 
What are the five biggest issues facing the candidate who is elected to this position? The single 
biggest issue is the PUD Commission itself, as the PUD will have to grapple with the internal challenges 
of two brand new members of the commission and the effects of that uncertainty will have on the PUD 
leadership and staff. 
As a military veteran and now entrepreneur and business owner, I have a lifetime of experiences joining 
and leading teams during times of crisis. Setting clear expectations and ensuring everyone knows what’s 
going on, what they need to do, and that they have the resources to do it is the paramount task in leading 
teams during times of uncertainty. 
 
 
Second, the external challenges of a global pandemic on the economy and the uncertainty of potential 
disruptions to the existing operational plans need to be shored up to ensure continuity of services is 
uninterrupted — addressed in the same way as in No. 1, but with a focus on revenue generation and the 
loss of potential grants or other funding and understanding quickly how that might throw off established 
plans. 
Third, the PUD needs to bring its “A” game to the countywide fiber conversation. It’s one thing to be a 
partner and it’s another to be driving the changes with the focus, energy, resources and capabilities it’s 
going to take to get fiber across and throughout Skagit County. I will address this by putting the energy 
and focus on the relationships and opportunities that can fast-track the changes we need. By identifying 
existing projects and technologies that could be folded into the current strategy, we could shave years and 
millions of dollars of time it might take to do this “at the speed of government.” 
Fourth, the PUD needs to be an active partner with agriculture and environmental initiatives and prioritize 
stable and affordable water access during droughts in order to maintain a viable agricultural industry 
remains in Skagit Valley. Healthy fields drive jobs and food security, as well as soil quality and 
ultimately water quality that improves the viability of salmon and our ocean environments as well. I will 
address this by insisting that the PUD be at the table early and often in support of agricultural use and 
environmental partnerships. Establishing plans and partnerships that get the water where it needs to be 
when it needs to be there is imperative and I’m a planner with experience working across diverse 
stakeholder sets. 
Fifth, the PUD needs to make sure it has the best talent on the field. Making sure the leadership team and 
staff at the PUD is organized, trained, equipped and oriented for success is a critical role of the 
commission. I have extensive experience hiring, maintaining, motivating and evaluating executives, 
senior staff and outcomes of enterprise-level initiatives. 
How will you address them? Answered above. 
Why should voters choose you? I am the candidate that can best represent all of Skagit County. I have 
solved problems and built world-class teams in government and the private sector and I have spent a 
lifetime developing the leadership skills to make sure the PUD continues to deliver on its mission and is 
ready for whatever comes next. I understand what makes Skagit County different and how to use those 
cultural strengths to keep it special. 
What sets you apart from your opponents?: As a Skagit County native and current business owner 
with school-age kids at home, I have a depth and breadth of connection to the entire Skagit County 
community that my opponents do not. I farm here and have started and run three other businesses in 
Skagit County, so I’m working with a diversity of neighbors, policymakers, customers, clients, and other 
stakeholders in and around PUD decisions every day in ways my opponents are not. My experience at the 
Economic Development Alliance of Skagit County (EDASC) gave me a countywide perspective of the 
policy and practical complexities and opportunities for both environmental conservation and economic 
development specific to Skagit County. 
How are you campaigning and engaging with voters during the pandemic?: I’m relying on social 
media and email messaging and will be rolling out signage and newspaper messaging throughout the 
campaign. As a digital native, I find Facebook, Instagram and YouTube as channels that help to 
efficiently connect and engage with voters. I have also secured the endorsements of key influencers in the 












Tearing Down Racism or Erasing Our History? 
(Coronado Times 16 July 20) … Edward Anthony Moore III 
There has been a lot of debate about whether or not we should be tearing down statues of Confederate 
leaders or renaming government institutions and facilities named after historic segregationists. Are we 
destroying monuments to racism or are we erasing important parts of our history? Let me tell you a short 
story and then I’ll let you decide. 
Carl Vinson served in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing Georgia’s 10th congressional 
district, from 1914 to 1965. He is sometimes referred to as the “Patriarch of the Armed Forces,” though 
he never served in the military, due to his role on various Armed Forces committees in the House and the 
logistical innovations that occurred during his service. 
Vinson was a staunch segregationist. He signed “The Southern Manifesto” in 1956, with a slew of 
other Southern politicians, in resistance to the Supreme Court ruling on “Brown v. Board of Education” 
that deemed segregated public schools unconstitutional. He retired from Congress in 1965, declining to 
seek reelection in 1964, the same year the Civil Rights Act was passed. 
In 1980, the United States Navy commissioned its third Nimitz-class Aircraft Carrier, no less than a 
floating city, the pinnacle of our military might. They named it the USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70). 
In 1956, as Congressman Vinson was applying his John Hancock to the “The Southern Manifesto,” 
an ambitious 11-year-old Black boy was attending Dunbar Junior High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
The next year, the Little Rock Nine would be the first black students to enroll at the formerly all-white 
Central High School, beginning the long and arduous road of desegregation, much to Vinson’s chagrin. 
This young boy, still in junior high school, was friends with the younger siblings of much of the Little 
Rock Nine and was able to hear first-hand accounts of the tribulations they were facing as they walked 
those whitewashed hallways. Tales of needing an elite armed guard, military jeeps, and helicopters to go 
to and from school. Tales of being openly abused and defamed while the abusers faced no consequences 
or retribution. Tales of receiving C grades for A papers, despite putting in twice as much time and 
producing higher quality work than white students who received better marks. 
In the next few years, this young boy would face a difficult decision. Either enter the fray of being 
one of those select few Black students permitted to enter a higher quality school on a limited basis and 
immerse himself in a hotbed of blatant racism and violent tension while being forced to constantly 
exercise restraint of tongue and fist, not retaliate and likely accept grades below the marks he’d earned, or 
attend the separate but not equal Horace Mann High School with a Black teaching staff who was invested 
in his future, supportive of his goals and would grade his work on merit. He chose the latter. He had a 
goal and C’s just would not cut it. 
He would graduate from Horace Mann in 1963 with stellar grades and submit his first application to 
the U.S. Naval Academy. It was denied. He pressed on, attending Southern Illinois University and applied 
to the Naval Academy again after his freshman year there. Once more he was denied. The young man 
confronted the realization that both his State Senators and the congressional representative from his home 
district were unlikely to appoint a young Black man to the prestigious academic institution meant to train 
and groom future Officers. There had been progress, but not that much. He had already enlisted in the 
U.S. Naval Reserve, so he would make his way as an enlisted man. A young, Black enlisted man in the 
good-ole-boys Navy of the time. 
This began the storied career of Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr. 
Admiral Moore would go on to serve his country in the Vietnam War, serve as Gunnery Officer, 
Communications Officer, Operations Officer, Navigator and earn a Master’s degree in Business 
Administration from U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He would become a Junior Assignment Officer 
and Shore Assignments Coordinator at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. He was then assigned to the USS 
BUCHANAN (DDG-14) as Executive Officer in 1979 and served as the second Commanding Officer of 
the USS LEWIS B. PULLER (FFG-23) before being promoted to Captain and first Commanding Officer 
of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser the USS COWPENS (CG-63). As the first Black Captain 
of an Aegis Class Cruiser, he led a successful Tomahawk missile strike against a sensitive target in Iraq. 
Admiral Moore would end his 38-year career as the highest-ranking Black officer in the Navy, a 3-
Star Admiral retiring as Commander, U.S. Naval Surface Forces, Pacific. 
 
 
During those 38 years he was awarded the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit Medal 
with four gold stars, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy 
Achievement Medal, and many other service and campaign awards. He also made significant 
contributions in pioneering systems integration aboard ships as the Navy ushered in a new era of 
technological advancement. Moore pioneered many things, not the least of which was an unprecedented 
avenue to the Flag Officer rank from enlisted service. Where the progress of society lagged behind his 
vision, he made his own path and cleared the way for those who came after him. 
In 1995 when he assumed command of Cruiser-Destroyer Group Three, his flagship was the USS 
CARL VINSON. He defied the odds and rose the ranks through the barriers of discrimination and then, as 
Task Force Commander, stood aboard a floating fortress named in commemoration of the man who had 
so adamantly opposed his equality; a monument to someone who fought tooth and nail to try to prevent 
him -and anyone who looked like him- from ever assuming such a command, or going to a decent school, 
from ever riding in the front of the bus, or eating in the same restaurants as white people. Carl Vinson 
spent his 51 years of service devoted to the belief, in word and action, that Vice Admiral Edward Moore 
Jr. was a second class citizen. 
Vice Admiral Edward Moore Jr. is my father. 
I have stood on the CARL VINSON as my father stepped aboard and hundreds of men and women 
jumped to attention and saluted to the announcement, “Admiral on deck!”  I have walked the 
passageways of that ship with him as young, Black sailors stepped out on a limb and broke rank to take 
the opportunity to thank him from the bottom of their hearts for paving the way ahead of them, with 
joyous smiles and reverent souls. I’ve watched thousands of brave men and women of every color and 
creed who have served this country at the highest level, offer this man the utmost respect for his service 
and devotion to this Nation and for leadership that changed their lives. 
I didn’t really know who Carl Vinson was until last week. My father never mentioned it. I walked the 
passageways, climbed the ladders, and stood on the deck of that ship as a child in awe of his father — 
without ever really knowing the poetry of the triumph written by determination and fate as he assumed 
command and stepped aboard. A story, that upon closer examination, seems to be written by the hand of 
Justice itself. 
So you tell me, who should the ship be named after? Who deserves a monument? Whose stories and 
ideals should we enshrine in our statues, our ships, our military bases, and our Capitol buildings? The 
great men and women of this country who defied the odds and triumphed over evil, doing so in service to 
all Americans? Or those who strove to preserve the evil of racism at the expense of so many of those 
heroes? 
My father cried when he retired. My father loves the Navy. He loves this country as too few do, in 
action and above his own life. Is it not time his country, at minimum, respect him and the 13% of the 
population with black skin enough to remove the state-sponsored glorification of those who fought to try 
and ensure we could never be truly free? 
Trust me, we will not forget our history because 10-foot statues of bigots do not loom in public 
squares. We will not forget slavery because traitors to the Union don’t have bases and war vessels in their 
names. We will not forget segregation because those who fought to preserve it are no longer celebrated as 
icons of the country they strove to divide. 
My Father never brought up Vinson’s history. When I realized what I had missed, I called him to talk 
about it. I sheepishly asked if he knew Carl Vinson’s history, knowing it was a silly question. Do you 
know what he said? “Yea, Carl Vinson certainly turned over in his grave when that ship became my 
Flagship.” He always knew and he never mentioned it. His life and his career said every word there was 
to say on the matter. 
So you tell me, who should that ship be named after? 
https://coronadotimes.com/news/2020/07/16/tearing-down-racism-or-erasing-our-history/ 
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